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Abstract
While the enlargement of the Euro area to new countries has reduced the average return
correlation among member countries, the nancial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis have led
to an increase in stock return correlation among old members. We nd that EMU core countries
portfolio allocation has been signicantly driven by diversication motives: they have reduced
their portfolio equity investment in assets issued by member countries featuring a stronger
returnscorrelation with domestic assets. This evidence sheds light on the determinants of the
sharp decline in bilateral equity investments in the Euro area after 2007, and points to the
importance of diversication benets.
JEL classication: F21, F30, F36, G11, G15




After the inception of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) two decades ago, the
literature unequivocally maintained the tendency of the Eurozone countries to disproportionately
invest in their partnersassets, both in bonds (Lane (2006), Giofré (2013)), and in equities (Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007), Balta and Delgado (2009), Berkel (2004), Slavov (2009)). Sousa and Lochard
(2011) and Allen and Song (2005) conrm a similar evidence for cross-border direct investments and
cross-border merger and acquisition activities.
However, within the general downfall of international nancial ows after the nancial crisis (Lane
(2013), Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011)), bilateral cross-border portfolio equity holdings within the
EMU area experienced an even more abrupt and persistent fall. This peculiar evidence occurred in
conjunction with a combination of outstanding events, such as the enlargement process, on the one
hand, and the nancial crisis, then turned into the sovereign debt crisis, on the other hand.
Giofré and Sokolenko (2020) highlight that the crisis has drastically weakened the linkages among
original members: a peculiar decline in economic development and, more importantly, a deterioration
of the control of corruption standards of Euro periphery countries, those more severely injured in
the sovereign debt crisis, induced a sharp decrease of their inward investments by the Euro area as
a whole.
In this paper, we investigate on the role played by diversication opportunities. Vermeulen
(2013) nds a signicant negative relationship between foreign equity holdings and stock market
correlations during the nancial crisis, while there is no relationship before the crisis. We nd,
relatively to the Euro area, that the increase in stock return correlation induced by the global crisis
has played a signicant role in explaining the change in the investment pattern of core countries
in EMU membersassets after 2007: an increase in return correlations implies lower diversication
opportunities and could be reected in lower investments. We highlight that core countries reduced
equity investment in foreign core and periphery economies after the crisis, but the decrease has been
signicantly larger in those EMU economiesassets highly correlated with domestic assets.
This paper contributes to the literature about the time-varying common currency e¤ect on bilat-
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eral portfolio investments, by adding the diversication motive to the drivers of the decline of the
within EMU investment after 2007, and complementing the explanation based on the corruption and
size factors, already highlighted in the literature.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we sketch the estimable
equation. In Section 3 we describe the data and discuss some descriptive statistics. In Section 4, we
perform the empirical analysis. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2 Estimable equation
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The dependent variable log(FPEsh), is the logarithm of the foreign portfolio equities (FPE) of
source country s in host country h.
Our regression specication accounts for pair-specic regressors (Zsh or Wsh), such as the re-
turnscorrelation or gravity variables, country-specic variables (Xh; Ys; Qh, Ts), such as size and
institutional variables, and time factors (D).
Among these covariates, continuous regressors (Qh, Ts and Wsh) are expressed in logarithmic
terms, so that their coe¢ cients, being the dependent variable also dened in logs, can be easily
interpreted in elasticity terms (e.g., if a signicant coe¢ cient is equal to 0.3, then a 10% increase in the
regressor induces a 3% increase in the dependent variable). Conversely, the e¤ect of a dichotomous
variable (Xh; Ys and Zsh) on a dependent variable expressed in logs is captured by the following
transformation of its coe¢ cients : e   1 (e.g., if a signicant coe¢ cient  is equal to 0.3, then the
e¤ect of a dummy equal to 1 on the dependent variable is e0:3   1 = 0:35; to be interpreted as the
1Our data are time varying, but for the sake of simplicity in notation, we drop the time index in the equations.
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e¤ect being 35% larger than the e¤ect of a dummy equal to 0).2
Among these variables, the dummies capturing the EMU country membership are crucial for
our analysis. EMUsh is a bilateral-specic dummy variable taking value 1 when both the source
country s and the host country h are EMU members, and 0 otherwise; EMUs (or EMUh) is instead
a country-specic dummy variable equal to 1 when the source country (or host country) is a EMU
member, and 0 otherwise.
Finally, D is a dummy capturing the time dimension, such as pre- or post-crisis period, which
allows us to detect any global shift in foreign investment due to macroeconomic shocks.
To investigate the dynamics of integration of the bilateral FPE in the euro area, the econometric
specication (1) is enriched to include interactions of the EMU dummies with other factors (A), so
as to seize the eventual incremental or erosive role played by these factors, such as the crisis, on the
EMU linkages.3
log(FPEsh) = + EMU + A+ EMU  A+ controls+ "sh (2)
Through a Di¤erence-in-Di¤erence approach, we aim at seizing how a factor A a¤ects the FPE
among EMU countries, on top of the global e¤ect played by A on FPE.
The econometric strategy adopted follows Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) who explicitly ad-
dress, within the standard trade log gravity models, the problem of ination of zero investment
data and the need to get estimates robust to di¤erent patterns of heteroskedasticity. Accordingly,
we model the dependent variable FPEsh as following a Poisson distribution, applying the Poisson
Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood estimator, with year dummy, individual xed e¤ect that in our case
corresponds to country-pair xed e¤ectsand with standard errors adjusted for two-way clustering
at the investing-destination country pair and year levels.
2Note that if the coe¢ cient is null (or non statistically signicant) then e0 1 = 0, i.e., the e¤ect of a dummy equal
to 1 is not di¤erent from the e¤ect of a dummy equal to 0.
3The subscript "" indicates sh; s or h, when the EMU dummy is, respectively, bilateral, source country-specic
or host country-specic.
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3 Data and descriptive statistics
3.1 Data
We consider the bilateral equity portfolio investments of 68 countries, for the period 2001-2017.4 We
adopt the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), released by the IMF, a dataset which has
been used in many recent papers (Fidora et al. (2007); Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007); Sorensen et al.
(2007); Giannetti and Koskinen (2010); Giofré (2013)). This survey collects security-level data from
the major custodians and large end-investors. Portfolio investment is broken down by instrument
(equity or debt) and residence of issuer, the latter providing information on the destination of portfolio
investment.5 The CPIS is however unable to address the issue of third-country holdings and round-
tripping, very frequent in the case of nancial o¤shore centers. Following the more recent literature on
o¤shore center classications, we exclude from our sample "the eight major pass-through economies
the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Hong Kong SAR, the British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, the Cayman
Islands, Ireland, and Singapore [hosting] more than 85 percent of the worlds investment in special
purpose entities, which are often set up for tax reasons" (Damgaard et al. (2018)).6
Details on the denition of the dependent variable and regressors, and information on their
respective sources are reported in Appendix A.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 reports the variables included in our analysis and their main descriptive statistics. The
subscript sh refers to the country-pair, and  indicates that the corresponding variable enters the
analysis for both the destination and the investing country.
[Table 1]
4See Appendix A for the full list of investing and destination countries.
5While the CPIS provides the most comprehensive survey of international portfolio investment holdings, it is still
subject to a number of important caveats. See data.imf.org/cpis, for more details on the survey.
6In Table 7, we consider alternative classications of o¤shore centers.
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The rst panel reports data on the dependent variable, i.e., the bilateral portfolio equities holdings
expressed in US$. They range from 0 to 1295 billions of US$, with a median of 8.10 millions and a
standard deviation of 29 billions.
The second panel refers to the main regressor, that is the bilateral stock returns correlation
variable, with a mean equal to 0.34, a median of 0.37 and a standard deviation equal to 0.62.
The third panel comprises all other regressors, and is further split into sub-groups. The size
variables considered are the GDP per capita and the GDP in US$. The GDP per capita of source
and host countries shows a large dispersion among countries: the GDP per capita mean is 24327
US$, while 50% of the sample has a GDP per capita lower than 16681 US$. The minimum value is
equal to 447 US$, while the maximum is 119225 US$, with a standard deviation of 21977 US$. A
notable degree dispersion is also present in the GDP in US$ variable.
With the only exception of the distance variable, the bilateral gravity variables are binary covari-
ates, expressing whether or not country pairs share a border, colonial linkages, a common language,
or legal origins.
The capital mobility variable ranges from 0 to 10, to indicate increasing levels of capital mobility:
its mean is equal to 4.48, the rst quartile is equal to 1.54, while the third quartile is equal to
6.92. Finally, the institutional variables refer to the control of corruption, and are drawn from
the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI, World Bank) and from Transparency International.7
These variablesindex goes from 0 to 100, reecting increasing country governance standards. For
instance, the mean for the "control of corruption" index (WGI) is around 68.74, with 25% of countries
reporting a result lower than 51.38, and another 25% of countries featuring an index above 91.20,
with a standard deviation equal to 25.40.




4.1.1 The dynamics of FPE and EMU linkages
In Figure 1, we report the dynamics of bilateral foreign portfolio equities (FPE), as in Giofré and
Sokolenko (2020) Panel a) reports the trend of bilateral foreign investment over years for all countries
in the sample: after normalizing to 1 its average value in 2001, the gure displays an increasing
pattern of FPE in the world until 2007, a drop in 2008 and then a recovery up to a level more than 3
times larger than its initial level. The drop in this gure reects, for equity holdings, the abrupt fall
in nancial ows due to the nancial crisis recorded by the literature (Lane (2013); Milesi-Ferretti
and Tille (2011)).
In panel b), FPE are regressed on the bilateral EMUsh dummy, year dummies D, and their
interaction EMUsh D, to seize the change in the impact of the EMUsh dummy on FPE over time.
Normalizing to 1 the e¤ect of the common currency in 2001, this gure displays the trend of the
EMU e¤ect on bilateral portfolio foreign investments. We can observe, rst, that there has been a
decreasing EMU e¤ect from 2007 onward; then, there has been no recovery, but rather a slow decline
down to 40 percent of its initial level, di¤erently from panel a).
[Figure 1]
This suggests that Euro area specic dynamics can be responsible of the persistence in the decline
of FPE among member countries. To properly address this issue, we analyze below the EMU e¤ect
in a multivariate regression, properly accounting for the heterogeneity within the EMU group.
Table 2 replicates, as a benchmark, the results in Giofré and Sokolenko (2020) about the e¤ect of
the bilateral EMU dummy, EMUsh, on bilateral foreign portfolio equity holdings, just considering
the dummy Period 2 (2007-2017), rather than splitting it into crisis and post-crisis dummy. The
dependent variable is the log of bilateral foreign equity investment (FPE). Regressors are reported
at the head of the rows. As specied above, the coe¢ cients of all regressors expressed in logs can
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be interpreted in elasticity terms, while the e¤ect of dummy variables on the dependent variable is
captured by the coe¢ cient  as follows: e   1.
In column 1, we include standard gravity variables, used in literature to dene the cultural and
geographic proximity between two countries for equity ows (Portes and Rey (2005); Portes et al.
(2001)), and equity holdings (Chan et al. (2005)). In our case, we include, among the gravity
variables, the distance between the capital cities of country s and country h, the border dummy
(equal to 1 for each country pair sharing a common border, 0 otherwise), the language dummy
(equal to 1 when the country s and the country h share the same language, 0 otherwise), the colonial
dummy (equal to 1 for those pairs of countries sharing a common colonial past, 0 otherwise), and the
legal origin dummy variable (equal to 1 when investor and destination countries have a common legal
origin, 0 otherwise). We expect geographical and cultural proximity to have a positive impact on
foreign portfolio equities, as a decrease in physical and cultural distance reduces information costs,
and then enhances investment by foreign investors.
Consistently with the gravity model approach, we also include the size variables, that express the
economic weight of the investing and host countries, such as market capitalization and GDP per
capita, and nally we control for capital mobility.
[Table 2]
The results, as predicted, show that the gravity variables have a strong impact on the FPE
allocation. The distance variable displays a negative coe¢ cient (-0.069), meaning that an increase in
distance between capital cities is associated with a decrease in foreign portfolio equities. Sharing a
common border leads to an increase of FPE by 49% (e0:401 1 = 0:49), having an o¢ cial language in
common increases FPE by 84%, having a common colonial past increases equities share by 4.1 times,
while the common legal origin seems to have no impact. The contribution of the size variables also
appears important. Stock market capitalization has a signicant and positive impact on the FPE,
which appears to be stronger for the host (0.783) than for the source country (0.567). The opposite
happens to the GDP per capita variable: an increase in the source countrys GDP strongly fosters
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foreign investment, with a non signicant e¤ect for the host countries. Capital mobility variables
plays a positive signicant role on the investing size, and a modest negative impact on the host side.
The coe¢ cient of the bilateral EMU dummy variable over the whole period is equal to 0.562, that
is EMU countries invest one another 75% more than other country-pairs.
In column (2) of Table 2, we try to capture the time variation of the EMU dummy, by including
a dummy for the period going from 2007 to 2017 (Period 2), that is, the declining period observed
in panel (b) of Figure 1. The coe¢ cient of the Period 2 dummy (-0.299) captures the general fall
(-26%) of bilateral FPE for non-EMU country pairs. We observe that the coe¢ cient of the EMUsh
dummy, referred to the excluded time span, i.e., the pre-nancial crisis period, is large, positive
and statistically signicant: EMU members used to invest one another 108% more than non-EMU
country pairs in the pre-crisis period. The e¤ect of the EMU dummy in the subsequent period is
computed by adding up the coe¢ cient of the corresponding interaction term (EMUsh  Period2) to
the non-interacted one (EMUsh).
The negative coe¢ cient of the interaction term EMUsh Period2 can be interpreted as the change
of the EMU e¤ect (on FPE) induced by the crisis (or, symmetrically, as the change of the crisis e¤ect
on FPE for EMU country pairs). It is negative and signicant, thus suggesting a signicant drop
from 108% (= e0:733   1) to 67% (= e0:733 0:220   1) in the EMU e¤ect on FPE, relatively to the
pre-crisis period (or, symmetrically, a more negative e¤ect of the crisis for EMU country pairs).
The results in Table 2 conrm, in a multivariate setting, the preliminary evidence above: after
2007, the common currency e¤ect on bilateral FPE has signicantly fallen, and therefore the linkages
among EMU countries have signicantly loosened. The results are quite similar, when restricting to
the sample of OLD EMU members, either on the investing side ((2a) and (2b)), or on the destination
side ((3a) and (3b)), or on both ((4a) and (4b)). As emphasized by Giofré and Sokolenko (2020),
this points to a slackening of the linkages among the original members because of the crisis, more
than to the inclusion of new countries less connected with the euro area.
Indeed, it is impossible to assess the enlargement e¤ect by investigating the investment dynamics
(pre- and post-crisis) of NEW EMU countries as a separate group, as they started entering the EMU
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group only since 2007 onwards, as shown in Figure 1. Giofré and Sokolenko (2020) try to seize the
enlargement e¤ect just indirectly, by observing the investment patterns over time of OLD EMU,
and of the whole EMU group, made up of OLD EMU only until 2007, but including also NEW
EMU thereafter, as far as they gradually enter the common currency area. By comparing these two
patterns, they indirectly infer a predominant role of the crisis over the enlargement.
4.1.2 OLD EMU group decomposition
In Table 3, following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2017), among others, we distinguish within the OLD
EMU group, the Euro corecountries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg,
and the Netherlands) and the Euro peripheryor Euro crisis countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal, and Spain), and investigate their investment patterns.
[Table 3]
In column (1a) and (1b) of Table 3, we observe that bilateral FPE among Euro core countries
su¤ered for the crisis, starting from 93% to 64% larger reciprocal investment. When considering,
instead, the cross investment of Euro core countries in Euro periphery countries (columns (2a) and
(2b)), we observe a clear picture of the collapse of the EMU linkages: on the whole period, their
investments are 28% larger than other countries, starting from 94% larger in the pre-crisis period, to
only 11% larger investment after the crisis.
When considering the investments of Euro periphery source countries, we observe that their
investment in Euro core countries ((3a) and (3b)) are on average 51% larger than other country
pairs, while their investment in periphery economies are 102% larger than other country pairs, but
there is no substantial di¤erence between the pre-crisis.and the subsequent period.
These results solicit a specic deeper investigation of the drivers of the fall in investment by core
countries in other OLD countriesassets.
In particular, we test how far the investment diversion out of the Euro area is attributable to the
pursuit of diversication benets, that might have foregone within the area, as a consequence of the
stronger correlation induced by the global and sovereign debt crisis.
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4.2 Main ndings
4.2.1 The role of returnscorrelation
In Figure 2, we report the dynamics of the bilateral correlation of monthly returns in the previous
year, after normalizing to 1 its 2001 value. Panel a) shows the dynamics of the worldwide stock
correlation, with a not clear-cut behavior. The returnscorrelation in the EMU group (panel b)),
shows instead a slightly decreasing pattern. This trend appears however related to the enlargement
of the Euro area, since, when restricting to the OLD EMU sample, we observe an increasing trend,




Table 4 conrms what shown in Figure 2 within a regression setting, whose dependent variable is
the one-year lagged correlation of monthly returns. The results in the rst column shows an increase
in stock correlation worldwide in the second period, while it declines for the whole EMU group.
However, when focusing on OLD EMU countries, this correlation signicantly increases after the
crisis, thus conrming that the decreasing trend for the whole EMU group is attributable to the
entrance of new members featuring less correlated stock markets.
In Table 5, we include the correlation variable in the multivariate analysis, in order to detect
whether it can help explain the evidence of the fall of core countries investment in OLD EMU
assets, shown in Table 3.
In particular, we interact our EMU dummies with the returnscorrelation variable, to assess how
foreign portfolio investments in the Euro respond to diversication benets.
In order to enhance the interpretability of the results, we include, rather than the continuous
correlation variable, a dichotomic one, H correls;h, equal to 1 if the correlation of the stock returns
between country s and h is larger than the mean, and 0 otherwise. Columns (#a) add to the
specication in Table 2 and 3, the correlation binary variable, while columns (#b) also include the
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interaction between the this variable and the corresponding EMU dummy. The coe¢ cient of the
binary variable H correls;h in columns (#a) is non signicant. This nding is consistent with the
literature which highlights a non systematic role of stock returnscorrelation in explaining foreign
portfolio equities for Euro area investors, in the rst decade of the EMU (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2007)). However, the results in columns (#b) show that a systematic diversication motive of
Euro area investors emerges after 2007, when the returnscorrelation among member countries gets
stronger.
[Table 5]
We observe indeed that in the second period (column (1b)), the linkages among EMU members
are even tightened, from 106% (e0:724  1) to 213% (e0:727+0:417  1), but only for those country pairs
with weakly correlated stock returns (H correls;h = 0), while the investments are hardly undercut,
down to 62% (e0:727+0:417 0:66n  1); for those country pairs whose stock returns are highly correlated
(H correls;h = 1):
It is evident that this e¤ect about the EMU group is led by the OLD EMU dynamics, and more
specically by the core countries dynamics. Indeed, the negative impact of the correlation variable
in the second period is larger for the OLD EMU sub-group than for the whole EMU group, and
even larger for the CORE sub-sub-group. In particular, the linkages among core countries fall from
91% to 57% in the second period, but only for highly correlated country pairs, while the weakly
correlated country pairs witness an even stronger reciprocal attractiveness. The underweighting of
highly correlated assets is particularly dramatic when considering the investment of core countries
in periphery countries: a strong and remarkable attractiveness before the crisis (92%), turns into
a negative e¤ect (-28%), denoting that the investment of core countries in periphery countries has
become signicantly lower than other country pairs bilateral investment. This latter nding is
consistent with the results in Giofré and Sokolenko (2020),who identify the core-periphery linkages
as the ones that have experienced the harshest deterioration after the crisis.
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4.2.2 Robustness
To provide consistency to our ndings, in Table 6 and 7, we undergo our main results to robustness
checks.
[Table 6]
In Table 6, we test the sensitivity of our analysis by re-dening our main regressor, that is the
dichotomic high return correlation variable, H correls;h, relative to the median, rather to the mean,
and the results are left substantially unchanged.
In Table 7, we consider alternative denitions of the o¤shore centers. In columns (#a), we follow
a classication, which, among EMU countries, excludes the Netherlands from the o¤shore list, but
adds Cyprus, Latvia and Malta (Zoromé (2007)). In columns (#b), we extend the list of o¤shore
centers to other EMU countries, such as Cyprus, Malta and Belgium, following the classication in
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2017).8
We nd that, under alternative denitions of o¤shore centers, the results, though marginally
di¤erent in size, conrm the baseline specications ones.
[Table 7]
4.2.3 Returnscorrelation, size and institutions
Finally, we try to reconcile our results with the previous ndings in the literature, which highlighted
the role of economic development and country governance factors as potential causes behind the fall
in bilateral investments in the Euro area. Giofré and Sokolenko (2020) nd that the worsening of
the economic condition of EMU countries and the weakened control of corruption mechanisms in
peripheral countries, likely due to the e¤ects of the crisis, have triggered a decline in bilateral FPE
among EMU countries.
8For a detailed list of o¤shore centers in the di¤erent specications, see Appendix A.
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In Table 8, we therefore check whether the change in the economic size and country governance of
EMU countries can be fruitfully combined with our high correlation variable, to explain the decline
in bilateral FPE among EMU countries.
[Table 8]
The rst index considered (columns (1a) and (1b)) is the "Control of Corruption" drawn from
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI, Source: World Bank), and captures the perceptions of the
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. As an alternative, in columns (2a) and
(2b), we consider the "Perceived Control of Corruption index" (Source: Transparency International),
which captures the perceived level of corruption in the public sector, relying on di¤erent country
sources. As far as the size indicators are concerned, we consider the GDP per capital, as a proxy of
the standard of living, and the GDP in US$, as a standard size measure.
Since in Giofré and Sokolenko (2020) the high size and high control of corruption indexes are de-
ned relative to their time-varying median, for the ease of comparability, the high returnscorrelation
binary variable is also dened relative to the median (as in Table 6).
Lets focus on columns (#b), reporting all interactions. Column (1b) shows that EMU invest-
ments in destination countries which display above the median values of control of corruption are
signicantly larger (from 58% to 200%), but this larger e¤ect is signicantly dampened by a high
returns correlation with domestic assets (174%). The same evidence emerges when considering
the alternative denition of perceived corruption (column (2b)), GDP per capita, or nominal GDP
(columns (3b) and (4b)).
[Table 9]
[Table 10]
We replicate the analysis of Table 8 for OLD EMU (Table 9) and core countries (Table 10). In
Table 9, the results found in Giofré and Sokolenko (2020) are conrmed, while the evidence of the
diversication motive is weaker. However, when focusing on core countries in Table 10, the results
are signicant again, thus revealing that the non signicant interaction coe¢ cients for OLD EMU in
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Table 9 are due to periphery investing countries. Indeed, in Table 10, core countries conrm to be
driven by diversication motives, on top of other concurrent factors, when choosing their portfolio
allocation in Euro area assets: a higher returnscorrelation, inevitably produced by the persistent
crisis, has reduced the diversication opportunities of core countries, thus contributing to the general
shrunk in bilateral portfolio investment among Euro area members.
5 Conclusions
This paper focuses on the contraction of core EMU countriesinvestments in the Euro area. We nd
that the increase in stock return correlation induced by the global crisis has played a signicant role
in explaining the change in the investment pattern of core countries towards other EMU members
after 2007. An increase in return correlations implies lower diversication opportunities and could
be reected in lower investments. We nd indeed that core countries reduced equity investment in
core and periphery economies after the crisis, and that the decrease is signicantly larger in those
economiesassets highly correlated with domestic assets.
This paper adds the diversication motive to the drivers of the reduction of the within EMU
investment after 2007, and complements and further corroborates the explanation based on the
corruption and size factors, already highlighted in the literature. Indeed, core countriesinvestors
conrm to underweight assets issued by countries with poor control of corruption, as already shown
in previous work, but, as a novel nding, we highlight that this e¤ect appears particularly harsh for
assets highly correlated with the domestic ones.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the dependent variable and the regressors used in the
analysis. The subscript sh refers to the country-pair sh,* indicates that the corresponding variable is
included in the analysis for both the destination and the investing country.
Descriptive Statistics
 Mean St. dev  1st Qu  Median 3rd Qu Min Max
I. Dependent variable
Equitiess,h (US $) 4.18E+09 2.901E+10 0 8.10E+06 3.04E+08 0 1.29E+12
II. Main regressor
Equity return correlations,h 0.34 0.36 0.10 0.37 0.62 -1 1
III. Other controls
Gravity variables
Distances,h (miles) 7207.36 4735.46 2781.71 7364.45 10159.53 59.62 19772.34
Border dummys,h 0.03 0.17 0 0 0 0 1
Colonial dummys,h 0.05 0.22 0 0 0 0 1
Language dummys,h 0.11 0.31 0 0 0 0 1
Legal origins dummys,h 0.25 0.43 0 0 0 0 1
Capital mobility
Capital mobility* 4.48 2.82 1.54 4.62 6.92 0.00 10.00
Size variables
GDP per cap*  (US $) 24327.00 21976.61 7262.00 16681.00 38166.00 447.00 1.19E+05
GDP*  (US $) 8.02E+11 2.07E+12 4.80E+10 2.14E+11 5.54E+11 1.27E+09 1.94E+13
Institutional variables
Control of Corruption* 68.74 25.40 51.38 72.45 91.20 4.30 100.00
Perceived Control of Corruption* 56.33 21.86 37.00 53.00 75.00 17.00 99.00
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Figure 1. Bilateral Foreign Portfolio Equity investment (FPE).
This gure reports the dynamics of the bilateral FPE over time. Panel a) reports the regression coe¢ -
cients of FPE on year dummy. Panel b) reports the regression coe¢ cients of FPE on the bilateral dummy
EMU sh interacted with year dummy. The gure also displays the entrance of new EMU members and the
time split into Period 1 and Period 2. The value of the coe¢ cient in 2001 is normalized to 1, so that the
other coe¢ cients are dened in relative terms.
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Table 2. FPE and EMU
This table reports the results of a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood regression (Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006)), with year dummy, individual country pair xed-e¤ects and standard errors adjusted for
two-way clustering at the investing-destination country pair and year levels. The dependent variable is
log(FPEs;h), where the subscript s; h represents the couple investing country s-destination country h. The
columns (#a) and (#b) consider specications, respectively, without and with interactions with the Period
2 dummy. Columns (1a) and (1b) consider the investments among EMU countries, columns (2a) and (2b)
consider OLD EMU countries investing in EMU host countries, columns (3a) and (3b) consider EMU
source countries investing in OLD EMU host countries, and columns (4a) and (4b) consider investments
among OLD EMU countries. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
EMUs,h OLDsEMUh EMUsOLDh OLDs,h
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
log(Distances,h) -0.069 *** -0.067 *** -0.068 *** -0.067 *** -0.069 *** -0.067 *** -0.068 *** -0.067 ***
( 0.018 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.018 )
Border dummys,h 0.401 *** 0.399 *** 0.400 *** 0.398 *** 0.400 *** 0.398 *** 0.399 *** 0.397 ***
( 0.065 ) ( 0.065 ) ( 0.065 ) ( 0.065 ) ( 0.065 ) ( 0.065 ) ( 0.065 ) ( 0.065 )
Language dummys,h 0.614 *** 0.608 *** 0.615 *** 0.609 *** 0.615 *** 0.608 *** 0.616 *** 0.610 ***
( 0.059 ) ( 0.059 ) ( 0.059 ) ( 0.059 ) ( 0.059 ) ( 0.059 ) ( 0.059 ) ( 0.059 )
Colonial dummys,h 1.630 *** 1.636 *** 1.630 *** 1.635 *** 1.630 *** 1.635 *** 1.629 *** 1.635 ***
( 0.205 ) ( 0.205 ) ( 0.205 ) ( 0.205 ) ( 0.205 ) ( 0.205 ) ( 0.205 ) ( 0.205 )
Legal origins dummys,h -0.084 -0.078 -0.085 -0.079 -0.085 -0.078 -0.086 -0.079
( 0.056 ) ( 0.056 ) ( 0.056 ) ( 0.056 ) ( 0.056 ) ( 0.056 ) ( 0.056 ) ( 0.056 )
log(Market caps) 0.567 *** 0.566 *** 0.566 *** 0.566 *** 0.567 *** 0.566 *** 0.566 *** 0.566 ***
( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 )
log(Market caph) 0.783 *** 0.779 *** 0.782 *** 0.779 *** 0.782 *** 0.779 *** 0.782 *** 0.779 ***
( 0.011 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.011 )
log(GDP per caps) 1.484 *** 1.526 *** 1.482 *** 1.523 *** 1.484 *** 1.525 *** 1.482 *** 1.523 ***
( 0.070 ) ( 0.073 ) ( 0.070 ) ( 0.073 ) ( 0.070 ) ( 0.073 ) ( 0.070 ) ( 0.073 )
log(GDP per caph) 0.039 0.066 * 0.039 0.066 * 0.039 0.066 * 0.039 0.066 *
( 0.033 ) ( 0.034 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.034 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.034 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.034 )
log(Capital mobilitys) 0.134 *** 0.122 *** 0.134 *** 0.122 *** 0.134 *** 0.122 *** 0.134 *** 0.122 ***
( 0.046 ) ( 0.045 ) ( 0.046 ) ( 0.045 ) ( 0.046 ) ( 0.045 ) ( 0.046 ) ( 0.045 )
log(Capital mobilityh) -0.056 *** -0.067 *** -0.056 *** -0.067 *** -0.056 *** -0.067 *** -0.056 *** -0.067 ***
( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 )
EMUs,h 0.562 *** 0.733 ***
( 0.049 ) ( 0.062 )
EMUs,h _Period 2 -0.220 ***
( 0.070 )
OLDsEMUh 0.567 *** 0.734 ***
( 0.049 ) ( 0.062 )
OLDsEMUh _Period2 -0.214 ***
( 0.070 )
EMUsOLDh 0.565 *** 0.733 ***
( 0.049 ) ( 0.062 )
EMUsOLDh _Period 2 -0.216 ***
( 0.070 )
OLDs,h 0.570 *** 0.734 ***
( 0.049 ) ( 0.062 )
OLDs,h _Period 2 -0.211 ***
( 0.070 )
Period 2 -0.299 *** -0.299 *** -0.299 *** -0.299 ***
( 0.077 ) ( 0.077 ) ( 0.077 ) ( 0.077 )
Observations 45216 45216 45216 45216 45216 45216 45216 45216
Adjusted R2 0.714 0.721 0.714 0.720 0.714 0.721 0.714 0.721
Dependent variable: log(FPEs,h)
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Table 3. FPE composition of OLD EMU: CORE and PERIPHERY
This table reports the results of a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood regression (Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006)), with year dummy, individual country pair xed-e¤ects and standard errors adjusted for
two-way clustering at the investing-destination country pair and year levels. The dependent variable is
log (FPEs;h), where the subscript s; h represents the couple investing country s-destination country h.
The columns (#a) and (#b) consider specications, respectively, without and with interactions with the
Period 2 dummy. Columns (1a) and (1b) consider the investments among CORE countries, columns (2a)
and (2b) consider CORE countries investing in PERIPHERY host countries, columns (3a) and (3b)
consider PERIPHERY source countries investing in CORE host countries, and columns (4a) and (4b)
consider investments among PERIPHERY countries. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and
10% levels, respectively.
COREs,h COREsPERIPHh PERIPHsCOREh PERIPHs,h
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
log(Distances,h) -0.089 *** -0.088 *** -0.102 *** -0.101 *** -0.103 *** -0.102 *** -0.102 *** -0.100 ***
( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 )
Border dummys,h 0.395 *** 0.393 *** 0.463 *** 0.461 *** 0.451 *** 0.449 *** 0.469 *** 0.468 ***
( 0.067 ) ( 0.067 ) ( 0.067 ) ( 0.067 ) ( 0.067 ) ( 0.067 ) ( 0.068 ) ( 0.067 )
Language dummys,h 0.519 *** 0.512 *** 0.530 *** 0.524 *** 0.532 *** 0.527 *** 0.523 *** 0.517 ***
( 0.059 ) ( 0.060 ) ( 0.063 ) ( 0.063 ) ( 0.061 ) ( 0.061 ) ( 0.061 ) ( 0.062 )
Colonial dummys,h 1.574 *** 1.580 *** 1.525 *** 1.531 *** 1.527 *** 1.534 *** 1.530 *** 1.537 ***
( 0.205 ) ( 0.204 ) ( 0.206 ) ( 0.206 ) ( 0.205 ) ( 0.205 ) ( 0.205 ) ( 0.205 )
Legal origins dummys,h 0.005 0.011 -0.020 -0.014 -0.015 -0.009 -0.015 -0.009
( 0.057 ) ( 0.057 ) ( 0.062 ) ( 0.062 ) ( 0.059 ) ( 0.059 ) ( 0.060 ) ( 0.060 )
log(Market caps) 0.561 *** 0.561 *** 0.557 *** 0.556 *** 0.560 *** 0.559 *** 0.559 *** 0.558 ***
( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 )
log(Market caph) 0.776 *** 0.773 *** 0.771 *** 0.768 *** 0.771 *** 0.768 *** 0.771 *** 0.768 ***
( 0.011 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 )
log(GDP per caps) 1.461 *** 1.501 *** 1.466 *** 1.506 *** 1.487 *** 1.528 *** 1.478 *** 1.519 ***
( 0.069 ) ( 0.072 ) ( 0.069 ) ( 0.072 ) ( 0.070 ) ( 0.073 ) ( 0.070 ) ( 0.073 )
log(GDP per caph) 0.037 0.064 * 0.048 0.074 ** 0.043 0.070 ** 0.048 0.075 **
( 0.033 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.033 )
log(Capital mobilitys) 0.139 *** 0.126 *** 0.144 *** 0.132 *** 0.140 *** 0.127 *** 0.142 *** 0.129 ***
( 0.046 ) ( 0.045 ) ( 0.046 ) ( 0.045 ) ( 0.046 ) ( 0.045 ) ( 0.046 ) ( 0.045 )
log(Capital mobilityh) -0.053 *** -0.064 *** -0.057 *** -0.067 *** -0.055 *** -0.066 *** -0.056 *** -0.067 ***
( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 )
COREs,h 0.536 *** 0.655 ***
( 0.065 ) ( 0.082 )
COREs,h _Period 2 -0.158 *
( 0.096 )
COREsPERIPHh 0.247 *** 0.662 ***
( 0.070 ) ( 0.092 )
COREsPERIPHh _Period2 -0.562 ***
( 0.108 )
PERIPHsCOREh 0.409 *** 0.414 ***
( 0.058 ) ( 0.075 )
PERIPHsCOREh _Period 2 0.010
( 0.095 )
PERIPHs,h 0.704 *** 0.612 ***
( 0.132 ) ( 0.167 )
PERIPHs,h _Period 2 0.137
( 0.222 )
Period 2 -0.308 *** -0.309 *** -0.324 *** -0.324 ***
( 0.075 ) ( 0.075 ) ( 0.075 ) ( 0.075 )
Observations 45216 45216 45216 45216 45216 45216 45216 45216
Adjusted R2 0.714 0.721 0.707 0.713 0.708 0.714 0.707 0.713
Dependent variable: log(FPEs,h)
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Figure 2. Stock returnscorrelations
This gure reports the dynamics of the bilateral correlation of monthly returns in the previous year
regressed on year dummies (panel a)), or on year dummies and their interaction with the corresponding
EMU dummy (panel b) to f)). The value of the coe¢ cient in 2001 is normalized to 1, so that the other
coe¢ cients are dened in relative terms.
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Table 4. Stock returnscorrelations and EMU
This table reports the results of a OLS regression of the bilateral correlation of monthly returns in
the previous year on di¤erent EMU dummies, the Period 2 dummy, and their interactions. The regression
specication also includes year dummy, individual country pair xed-e¤ects and standard errors adjusted
for two-way clustering at the investing-destination country pair and year levels. ***, **, and * indicate
signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EMU-EMU 0.302 ***
( 0.010 )
















PERIPHERY-PERIPHERY_Period 2 0.091 ***
( 0.026 )
Period 2 0.293 *** 0.301 *** 0.292 *** 0.293 *** 0.293 *** 0.293 ***
( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 )
Observations 42728 42728 42728 42728 42728 42728
Adjusted R2 0.077 0.095 0.093 0.087 0.087 0.082
Dependent variable: stock returns' correlation (correl s,h)
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Table 5. Main ndings: FPE and the role of stock returnscorrelations
This table reports the results of a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood regression (Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006)), with year dummy, individual country pair xed-e¤ects and standard errors adjusted for
two-way clustering at the investing-destination country pair and year levels. The dependent variable is
log (FPEs;h), where the subscript s; h represents the couple investing country s-destination country h.
The columns (#a) and (#b) consider specications, respectively, without and with interactions with the
High returnscorrelation (H correls;h) binary variable. Columns (1a) and (1b) consider the investments
among EMU countries, columns (2a) and (2b) consider the investments among OLD countries, columns
(3a) and (3b) consider the investments among CORE countries, columns (4a) and (4b) consider CORE
source countries investing in PERIPHERY host countries. As specied at the bottom of the table, all
controls of Table 2 are included, but not reported. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10%
levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: log(FPEs,h)
EMUs,h OLDs,h COREs,h COREsPERIPHh
(1a) (1b) (4a) (4b) (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
EMUs,h 0.726 *** 0.724 ***
( 0.062 ) ( 0.062 )
EMUs,h _Period 2 -0.218 *** 0.417 **
( 0.070 ) ( 0.164 )
EMUs,h _H correls,h _Period 2 -0.661 ***
( 0.160 )
OLDs,h 0.727 *** 0.725 ***
( 0.062 ) ( 0.062 )
OLDs,h _Period 2 -0.210 *** 0.635 ***
( 0.071 ) ( 0.132 )
OLDs,h _H correls,h _Period 2 -0.875 ***
( 0.127 )
COREs,h 0.649 *** 0.649 ***
( 0.081 ) ( 0.082 )
COREs,h _Period 2 -0.156 0.836 ***
( 0.096 ) ( 0.132 )
COREs,h _H correls,h _Period 2 -1.035 ***
( 0.127 )
COREsPERIPHh 0.654 *** 0.654 ***
( 0.092 ) ( 0.092 )
COREsPERIPHh _Period2 -0.560 *** 0.378
( 0.108 ) ( 0.309 )
COREsPERIPHh _H correls,h _Period 2 -0.981 ***
( 0.305 )
H correls,h 0.052 0.078 0.050 0.080 0.070 0.095 0.077 0.084
( 0.060 ) ( 0.061 ) ( 0.060 ) ( 0.061 ) ( 0.060 ) ( 0.060 ) ( 0.061 ) ( 0.061 )
Period 2 -0.306 *** -0.300 *** -0.306 *** -0.297 *** -0.316 *** -0.307 *** -0.317 *** -0.316 ***
( 0.077 ) ( 0.076 ) ( 0.077 ) ( 0.077 ) ( 0.075 ) ( 0.075 ) ( 0.075 ) ( 0.075 )
Controls: size, gravity and capital
mobility variables
Observations 41513 41513 41513 41513 41513 41513 41513 41513
Adjusted R2 0.721 0.722 0.721 0.723 0.721 0.723 0.714 0.714
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Table 6. Robustness: High correlation (Median)
This table is the same as Table 5, but the binary High stock returns correlation variable is dened
relative to the median, rather than to the mean.
Robustness: higher than median returns' correlation
EMUs,h OLDs,h COREs,h COREsPERIPHh
(1a) (1b) (4a) (4b) (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
EMUs,h 0.729 *** 0.727 ***
( 0.062 ) ( 0.062 )
EMUs,h _Period 2 -0.219 *** 0.311 *
( 0.070 ) ( 0.173 )
EMUs,h _H correls,h _Period 2 -0.553 ***
( 0.169 )
OLDs,h 0.730 *** 0.727 ***
( 0.062 ) ( 0.062 )
OLDs,h _Period 2 -0.210 *** 0.548 ***
( 0.070 ) ( 0.136 )
OLDs,h _H correls,h _Period 2 -0.786 ***
( 0.131 )
COREs,h 0.650 *** 0.650 ***
( 0.081 ) ( 0.082 )
COREs,h _Period 2 -0.157 0.795 ***
( 0.096 ) ( 0.130 )
COREs,h _H correls,h _Period 2 -0.993 ***
( 0.125 )
COREsPERIPHh 0.656 *** 0.656 ***
( 0.093 ) ( 0.093 )
COREsPERIPHh _Period2 -0.559 *** 0.208
( 0.108 ) ( 0.336 )
COREsPERIPHh _H correls,h _Period 2 -0.804 **
( 0.332 )
H correls,h 0.011 0.031 0.008 0.033 0.029 0.050 0.036 0.041
( 0.054 ) ( 0.055 ) ( 0.054 ) ( 0.055 ) ( 0.054 ) ( 0.054 ) ( 0.055 ) ( 0.055 )
Period 2 -0.303 *** -0.299 *** -0.303 *** -0.296 *** -0.313 *** -0.305 *** -0.315 *** -0.314 ***
( 0.077 ) ( 0.077 ) ( 0.077 ) ( 0.077 ) ( 0.076 ) ( 0.075 ) ( 0.075 ) ( 0.075 )
Controls: size, gravity and capital mobility
variables
Observations 41513 41513 41513 41513 41513 41513 41513 41513
Adjusted R2 0.721 0.722 0.721 0.722 0.721 0.723 0.713 0.713
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Table 7. Robustness: alternative o¤shore centers
This table is the same as Table 5, but the o¤shore countries are dened according to two alternative
denitions: columns (#a) follow the classication in Zoromé (2007), while columns (#b) follow Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2017) (see Appendix A.1 for details).
Robustness: alternative offshore centres
EMUs,h OLDs,h COREs,h COREsPERIPHh
IMF (2007) L-MF (2017) IMF (2007) L-MF (2017) IMF (2007) L-MF (2017) IMF (2007) L-MF (2017)
(1a) (1b) (4a) (4b) (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
EMUs,h 0.931 *** 0.919 ***
( 0.064 ) ( 0.068 )
EMUs,h _Period 2 0.383 ** 0.371 **
( 0.156 ) ( 0.164 )
EMUs,h _H correls,h _Period 2 -0.707 *** -0.658 ***
( 0.151 ) ( 0.159 )
OLDs,h 0.932 *** 0.919 ***
( 0.064 ) ( 0.068 )
OLDs,h _Period 2 0.562 *** 0.547 ***
( 0.132 ) ( 0.139 )
OLDs,h _H correls,h _Period 2 -0.882 *** -0.829 ***
( 0.126 ) ( 0.133 )
COREs,h 0.831 *** 0.762 ***
( 0.079 ) ( 0.088 )
COREs,h _Period 2 0.748 *** 0.735 ***
( 0.133 ) ( 0.128 )
COREs,h _H correls,h _Period 2 -1.038 *** -0.954 ***
( 0.129 ) ( 0.122 )
COREsPERIPHh 0.656 *** 0.785 ***
( 0.096 ) ( 0.099 )
COREsPERIPHh _Period2 0.443 0.457
( 0.309 ) ( 0.321 )
COREsPERIPHh _H correls,h _Period 2 -1.059 *** -1.098 ***
( 0.305 ) ( 0.316 )
H correls,h 0.111 * 0.113 * 0.113 * 0.115 * 0.132 ** 0.132 ** 0.122 * 0.125 *
( 0.065 ) ( 0.066 ) ( 0.065 ) ( 0.066 ) ( 0.064 ) ( 0.065 ) ( 0.065 ) ( 0.066 )
Period 2 -0.309 *** -0.282 *** -0.305 *** -0.279 *** -0.322 *** -0.296 *** -0.347 *** -0.307 ***
( 0.080 ) ( 0.083 ) ( 0.080 ) ( 0.083 ) ( 0.078 ) ( 0.082 ) ( 0.078 ) ( 0.082 )
Controls: size, gravity and capital mobility
variables
Observations 37031 35828 37031 35828 37031 35828 37031 35828
Adjusted R2 0.698 0.700 0.699 0.701 0.701 0.702 0.692 0.692
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Table 8. The role of stock returnscorrelation controlling for institutions and size
This table reports the results of a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood regression (Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006)), with year dummy, individual country pair xed-e¤ects and standard errors adjusted for
two-way clustering at the investing-destination country pair and year levels. The dependent variable is
log (FPEs;h), where the subscript s; h represents the couple investing country s-destination country h.
Columns (#a) report the results of the interaction of the bilateral EMU sh dummy with two measures of
corruption ((1a) to (2b)) and two measures of size ((3a) to (4b)). Columns (#b) consider the additional
interaction with the High returns correlation (H correls;h) dummy. As specied at the bottom of the
table, all controls of Table 2 are included, but not reported. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5,
and 10% levels, respectively.
EMU
Control of corruption Size
Perceived Index (Transparency Intl.) GDP per capita GDP US$
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
EMUs,h 0.457 *** 0.459 *** 0.366 *** 0.366 *** -1.152 *** -1.171 *** 0.379 ** 0.348 **
( 0.095 ) ( 0.095 ) ( 0.116 ) ( 0.116 ) ( 0.232 ) ( 0.232 ) ( 0.154 ) ( 0.154 )
EMUs,h _H WGIh 0.121 0.642 ***
( 0.101 ) ( 0.195 )
EMUs,h _H WGIh _H correls,h -0.547 ***
( 0.168 )
EMUs,h _H Perc Indexh 0.213 * 0.766 ***
( 0.121 ) ( 0.197 )
EMUs,h _H Perc Indexh _H correls,h -0.577 ***
( 0.156 )
EMUs,h _H GDP per caph 1.752 *** 2.386 ***
( 0.235 ) ( 0.276 )
EMUs,h _H GDP per caph _H correls,h -0.638 ***
( 0.150 )
EMUs,h _H GDPh US$ 0.182 0.838 ***
( 0.157 ) ( 0.209 )
EMUs,h _H GDPh US$ _H correls,h -0.645 ***
( 0.143 )
H WGIh 0.114 * 0.121 *
( 0.066 ) ( 0.066 )
H Perc Indexh 0.110 0.114
( 0.071 ) ( 0.071 )
H GDP per caph -0.271 *** -0.297 ***
( 0.098 ) ( 0.098 )
H GDPh US$ 0.786 *** 0.756 ***
( 0.055 ) ( 0.055 )
H correls,h 0.008 0.010  *** 0.023  *** 0.000
( 0.055 ) ( 0.055 ) ( 0.057 ) ( 0.055 )
Controls: size, gravity and capital mobility
variables
Observations 45216 41513 45216 41513 45216 41513 45216 41513
Adjusted R2 0.717 0.719 0.717 0.718 0.711 0.713 0.722 0.723
WGI Index (World Bank)
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Table 9. The role of stock returnscorrelation controlling for institutions and size
(OLD countries)
This table is the same as Table 8, but focuses on OLD countries.
OLD
Control of corruption Size
Perceived Index (Transparency Intl.) GDP per capita GDP US$
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
OLDs,h 0.470 *** 0.473 *** 0.454 *** 0.459 *** 0.456 *** 0.467 *** 0.479 *** 0.444 ***
( 0.056 ) ( 0.056 ) ( 0.057 ) ( 0.057 ) ( 0.061 ) ( 0.062 ) ( 0.135 ) ( 0.058 )
OLDs,h _H WGIh 0.195 *** 0.408 ***
( 0.050 ) ( 0.156 )
OLDs,h _H WGIh _H correls,h -0.227
( 0.160 )
OLDs,h _H Perc Indexh 0.205 *** 0.422 ***
( 0.050 ) ( 0.152 )
OLDs,h _H Perc Indexh _H correls,h -0.231
( 0.157 )
OLDs,h _H GDP per caph 0.222 *** 0.493 ***
( 0.052 ) ( 0.151 )
OLDs,h _H GDP per caph _H correls,h -0.292 *
( 0.157 )
OLDs,h _H GDPh US$ 0.085 0.300 **
( 0.137 ) ( 0.117 )
OLDs,h _HGDPh US$ _H correls,h -0.091
( 0.123 )
H WGIh 0.079 0.085
( 0.060 ) ( 0.060 )
H Perc Indexh 0.092 0.095
( 0.065 ) ( 0.065 )
H GDP per caph -0.260 *** -0.289 ***
( 0.097 ) ( 0.098 )
H GDPh US$ 0.793 *** 0.729 ***
( 0.055 ) ( 0.054 )
H correls,h 0.005 0.004  *** 0.025  *** -0.024
( 0.057 ) ( 0.057 ) ( 0.058 ) ( 0.060 )
Controls: size, gravity and capital mobility
variables
Observations 45216 41513 45216 41513 45216 41513 45216 41513
Adjusted R2 0.721 0.722 0.721 0.722 0.716 0.716 0.722 0.726
WGI Index (World Bank)
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Table 10. The role of stock returnscorrelation controlling for institutions and size
(CORE countries)
This table is the same as Table 8, but focuses on CORE countries.
CORE
Control of corruption Size
Perceived Index (Transparency Intl.) GDP per capita GDP US$
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
COREs,h 0.338 *** 0.345 *** 0.328 *** 0.337 *** 0.346 *** 0.356 *** 0.345 *** 0.354 ***
( 0.075 ) ( 0.075 ) ( 0.074 ) ( 0.074 ) ( 0.073 ) ( 0.073 ) ( 0.070 ) ( 0.071 )
COREs,h _H WGIh 0.256 *** 0.713 ***
( 0.054 ) ( 0.194 )
COREs,h _H WGIh _H correls,h -0.482 **
( 0.198 )
COREs,h _H Perc Indexh 0.271 *** 0.724 ***
( 0.053 ) ( 0.188 )
COREs,h _H Perc Indexh _H correls,h -0.479 **
( 0.192 )
COREs,h _H GDP per caph 0.287 *** 0.775 ***
( 0.052 ) ( 0.187 )
COREs,h _H GDP per caph _H correls,h -0.516 ***
( 0.191 )
COREs,h _H GDPh US$ 0.284 *** 0.478 ***
( 0.048 ) ( 0.134 )
COREs,h _H GDPh US$ _H correls,h -0.210
( 0.140 )
H WGIh 0.052 0.055
( 0.061 ) ( 0.061 )
H Perc Indexh 0.079 0.077
( 0.066 ) ( 0.066 )
H GDP per caph -0.173 * -0.207 **
( 0.096 ) ( 0.096 )
H GDPh US$ 0.765 *** 0.735 ***
( 0.053 ) ( 0.053 )
H correls,h 0.037 0.035  *** 0.048  *** 0.004
( 0.057 ) ( 0.057 ) ( 0.058 ) ( 0.059 )
Controls: size, gravity and capital mobility
variables
Observations 45216 41513 45216 41513 45216 41513 45216 41513
Adjusted R2 0.717 0.718 0.718 0.718 0.714 0.714 0.723 0.723




Foreign Portfolio Equities: Cross-border holdings of equities issued by host country residents and
held by the source country residents. Source: Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (IMF).
Investing and destination countries
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China
Hong Kong, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Kazakhstan, Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mauri-
tius, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay,
Venezuela.
O¤shore centres
Note that, as exception to the list above, the below mentioned countries are considered as investing,
but not as destination economies.
Baseline specication: the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Hong Kong SAR, Ireland, and Singapore
(Damgaard et al. (2018)).
Robustness, Table 7, columns #a): Bahrain, Hong Kong, Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta,
Mauritius, the Netherlands, Panama, Singapore, Switzerland, Belgium, United Kingdom (Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2017))
Robustness, Table 7, columns #b): Bahrain, Barbados, Hong Kong, Cyprus, Ireland, Lux-
embourg, Malta, Mauritius, Panama, Singapore, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Latvia, Uruguay
(Zoromé (2007))
A.1 II. Stock returnscorrelation
The correlation between the stock market returns of the host and source country, expressed in US
dollars, is computed as the lagged correlation of monthly returns in the previous year.
Source: Monthly Monetary and Financial Statistics (MEI), OECD
III. Size variables
GDP per capita: Gross domestic product divided by midyear population (in current U.S.$). Source:
World Development Indicators, World Bank.
GDP in US$: Gross Domestic Product, Current U.S. Dollars, Annual, Not Seasonally Adjusted.
Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED).
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IV. Gravity variables
Distance: Measure of the distance between the capital of the source and the host country, estimated
with the great circle distance in miles. Source: CEPIIs distance measures, the GeoDist database.
Border dummy: Dummy variable that takes the value equal to 1 when a pair of countries have
at least one border in common, and 0 otherwise. Source: CEPIIs distance measures, the GeoDist
database.
Colonial dummy: Dummy variable that takes the value equal to 1 for those pair of countries that
share a common colonial past, and 0 otherwise. Source: CEPIIs distance measures, the GeoDist
database.
Language dummy: Dummy variable that takes the value equal to 1 when a pair of countries have
an o¢ cial language in common, and 0 otherwise. Source: CEPIIs distance measures, the GeoDist
database.
Legal origins dummy: Dummy variable that takes the value equal to 1 for those pair of countries
that share a common origin (British, French, Socialist, German or Scandinavian).
V. Capital mobility
Capital mobility: Rank from 1 to 10, denoting increasing capital mobility, for both the source and
the host country. Source: Economic Freedom of the World.
VI. Institutional variables
Control of Corruption: Percentile Rank of control of corruption in the host country. Control of
corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain,
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and
private interests. Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank)
Perceived Corruption Index. The index scores and ranks countries and territories around the
world on the perceived level of corruption in the public sector. It is an aggregate index which scores
1-100 from very clean to highly corrupted countries and which draws on a number of di¤erent data
sources that capture business and expert views across di¤erent countries. Source: Transparency
International (https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi)
31
